Smoothing the High Seas

A Deleuzoguattarian Analysis of the Somali Pirates

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The Somali pirates, a group often misunderstood and distorted, have been reduced in modern discourse to be 'simply evil'. This characterization, seen in films such as Captain Phillips (2010), glosses over the nuances of the pirates' existence. The following paper takes a different approach, looking at the pirates through a theoretical lens seeking to understand their existence as a force pushing back against global capitalism.

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Too often in today's literature and media, Somali pirates have been over-simplified or caricatured. They are frequently portrayed as basic thieves or hostage takers with no legitimate grievances who are hell-bent on strictly violent interactions. In the following paper, my goal is firstly to disperse with the over-simplified narrative provided in films such as Captain Philips. Secondly, my aim is to provide a more nuanced analysis of the Somali pirates by embedding their existence in a historical framework. Specifically, the following paper sheds light on the historical conditions of Euro-capitalist exploitation in the 1990s that transformed the native Somali fisherpeople into the pirates we know today. Further, it examines the relationship between the State's sovereign power and the so-called 'Golden Age' pirates of the 17th century while attempting to draw a parallel between pirates of the 17th century and those of the 21st century. Finally, I utilize the works of post-modern philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari as an attempt to understand the Somali pirates in a better, or at least different, way. By examining their current existence and relationship to the State and global capital through a Deleuzoguattarian (henceforth known as 'DeGean') framework I am able to emphasize the nomadic and war machinic elements of their organization and their reaction to the violence and control of the State.

The History of the Somali Pirates

When one thinks of modern day pirates, one does not ponder on Blackbeard or Captain Kidd, but rather on the notorious story of Captain Richard Phillips who saved his ship from Somali hijackers in 2009, and has since been portrayed by Tom Hanks in the 2013 film Captain Phillips. While inherently problematic, the narrative of the Captain Phillips has captured the modern collective spotlight (Carlson 2014). That being said, despite the narrative's hegemony, there is still no single, commonly accepted narrative of the pirates of Somalia. Indeed, numerous scholars have tried to explain, and even justify (Aiyer / Dombrowski / Marcus 2010: 3–9), the pirates' existence in more (Osei-Tutu 2011: 1–24) or less (Hansen 2011: 26–31) flattering ways. My goal here is not to parse through the various ethnographies to determine which is correct, but rather to attempt to synthesize works from both sides to give a brief history of the Somali pirates. Thus, this section will touch upon the history of the Somali state and its nomads from the 1970s onwards. In particular, the section provides an account of illegal fishing and dumping as one major impetus for the rise of piracy in the 1990s.

In the 1970s and 1980s, severe droughts occurred that caused the destruction of the livestock that Somali farmers relied upon for their livelihood; crops died and animals could not be fed. Following the droughts, the farmers became 'pastoral nomads' and slowly began making their way towards the Northeast Coast of Somalia (Carlson 2009: 5). As drought and famine continued, the people of Somalia had to find a new form of subsistence, and growth along the coastline began to increase. Once the farmers were settled, they transitioned from land-based livestock to fishing and other maritime activities; the farmers became full-time fishermen. Operating in small, wooden ships, villagers would venture off the Horn of Africa and trawl for tuna and swordfish to feed their families and to sell (Waldo 2009). While the state of Somalia did not have an official Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) prohibiting foreign trawlers from fishing in Somali waters, the government did have a navy and established a 200 nautical-mile territorial zone around the Horn of Africa (Hansen 2011: 29). At that time, the fish stocks of Somalia were safe from foreign vessels. However, this all changed, after the fall of the military dictator Siyad Barre in 1991. When the dictatorship crumbled and Somalia became a 'failed-state', the country was plunged into civil war with multiple factions vying for control of the government. African Union peace-

keepers and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) troops clashed, and TFG troops began arming themselves with Yemeni weapons. In attempts to quell the growing unrest, TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf imposed an embargo and a blockade on the shipment of goods and weapons from Yemen. Not only did this blockade harm the Somali fishermen who, previously, were free in their travels, but it also forced people to choose sides (Lucas 2013: 58–59). While there is significantly more to say regarding the relationship between the United Nations (UN), Yemen, the African Union, and other factions vying for control in the region, attempting to relay such a history would exceed the scope of this paper (Wezeman 2010, Haid 2015). It thus suffices to highlight that the unrest in Somalia caught the attention of numerous external powers, and with no EEZ established, a fractured navy without a State, and internal conflict occurring, the perfect storm for foreign fishing piracy arose.

With no one to protect Somalia's territorial waters, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing fleets from European and Asian countries advanced upon Somali waters. While reports are unclear, low estimates argue that during the 1990s, over 200 foreign ships were engaged in illegal fishing while the number rose to over 800 fleets in 2005 (Lucas 2013: 58; Waldo 2009). Further estimates have placed the value of marine life wrested from Somali waters in the early 2000s at between $450 million and $1 billion (Waldo 2009, Aiyer / Dombrowski / Marcus 2010: 6). Regardless of the actual monetary value, however, the IUU fleets "neither compensate[d] the local fishermen, [paid] tax, royalties nor [...] respect[ed] any conservation and environmental regulations" (Waldo 2009). What's more, in addition to the immediate livelihood being taken away from Somali fisherpeople, IUU

fleets, due to their illegal and unregulated nature, would not follow sustainable fishing practices. Given that, they utilized numerous deleterious means to acquire fish such as harvesting juveniles, using indiscriminate-explosives which kill endangered species, and using drift nets, all of which devastated local ecosystems (Waldo 2009). In addition to these unsustainable fishing practices, claims that foreign vessels were dumping chemical and nuclear waste into Somali waters with no repercussions arose (Aiyer / Dombrowski / Marcus 2010: 7). In early 2005, allegations made by local Somalis that waste was being dumped in their water were vindicated after the earthquake and subsequent tsunami in the Indian Ocean of December 26th of the previous year which also hit Somali shores. Just a year after the earthquake, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) released their rapid assessment on the damage caused by the tsunami and analyzed the harms that occurred to Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles, Yemen, and Somalia (UNEP 2006: 1–140). While investigating Somalia, the UNEP report verified what Somali citizens had been saying for years: foreign waste was being dumped off Somali shores. Indeed, the report found that after the tsunami, not only hospital and leathertreatment waste was washed onto Somali shores, but radioactive and other carcinogenic forms of waste were found ashore contaminating the ground water of communities living along the Horn of Africa (UNEP 2006: 133–134).

The historical relationships between pirates and the State are as deep as the seas.

Turning the clock back to the beginnings of Somalia's civil war in 1991, we begin to see how and why the pirates emerged. With no EEZ under UN protection, no formal military to protect territorial claims, and IUU fleets descending upon Somali waters, the fisherpeople of the Somali coast became a de facto coast guard that began attacking and fining crews of foreign trawlers (Lucas 2013: 58). While this small blow to the international, illegal fish trade did some damage – reports indicate that about $80 million were made by pirates in 2010 –, the fisherpeople's livelihood was permanently destroyed due to the unsustainable fishing practices employed and the dumping of toxic waste (Aiyer / Dombrowski / Marcus 2010: 7). This destruction, as well as the recognition that holding cargo ships for ransom provided an extremely lucrative way to make money, turned the de facto Somali coast guard into pirates in the proper sense of the word. From the late 1990s onwards, pirates began utilizing (true) narratives of illegal fishing and dumping to justify their presence at sea. In the course of this, they grew from mere defenders of the sea to the 'enemies of all' (Hansen 2011: 26). As the illegal fishing industry expanded, the already desperate Somali fisherpeople were pushed over the edge by international capital and the State apparatus and thus became the first real, modern day pirates (Lucas 2013: 58).

Although pirates have historically been understood and defined rather simplistically – that is to say robbers on the high seas –, such a one-dimensional definition does the phenomenon of the pirate a disservice. Specifically, the historical relationships between pirates and the sovereignty of the State, and further, between Somalia's pirates and their historical analogues of 17th century, are as deep as the seas themselves. In order for us to make sense of the Somali pirates as not just 'evil hostage takers', we must turn now to the history of pirates and piracy and attempt to traverse these partially charted waters.

Somalia's Pirates as 'Pirates'

The history of piracy is long and riddled with half-truths, fabrications, and romanticized

tales. Since first hand ethnographies of life aboard pirate ships are few and far between, scholars have been forced to fill in the gaps left by the ethnographic patchwork. Due to this incomplete history, the very definition of 'pirate' has been called into question with some noting that only certain types of maritime marauders ought to be considered pirates. Indeed, Gabriel Kuhn, in *Life Under the Jolly Roger*, draws a distinction between types of piracy and pirates as such. In this section, we will not only examine several vital distinctions between 'piracy' and 'pirates', but also attempt to place the Somali pirates in relation to both traditional and radical understandings of what it means to be a pirate and the pirate's relation to the State.

Kuhn, in his history of piracy, notes that what is traditionally defined as 'piracy' – that is to say, robbing at sea – was practiced not only by those whom we call 'pirates', but also by buccaneers and privateers; two categories Kuhn distinguishes from 'pirates' proper. The first group, buccaneers, refer to a specific group of hunters on Hispaniola, what is now Haiti and the Dominican Republic. While not strictly maritime, the hunters of Hispaniola were known to rob sea faring vessels and thus were called pirates simply because they engaged in acts of maritime piracy (Kuhn 2010: 8–9). Privateers, on the other hand, practiced maritime piracy, but did so under the auspices of a government. Indeed, as Kuhn says, "[a] privateer is a sea robber who acts under the license of a legal authority" (Kuhn 2010: 9). During the 17th century, when European powers were scrambling for control of the Americas, leaders of different countries authorized the legal robbing of foreign ships by non-nationals. In other words, buccaneers who had a 'letter of marque' from England could rob Spanish ships all they wanted and England would turn a blind eye (Kuhn 2010: 9). Indeed, privateering appears to be one of the first instances of what we might now call 'proxy warfare'.

The nomad is placed in opposition to the State and is in perpetual conflict with the State

Kuhn distinguishes the aforementioned examples of piracy from 'pirates' proper by citing and endorsing an early 18th century English legal definition: "[a] pirate is in a perpetual war with every individual, and every state, Christian or infidel. Pirates properly have no country, but by nature of their guilt, separate themselves, and renounce on this matter, the benefit of all lawful societies" (Kuhn 2010: 8). This definition comes with some necessary baggage that must be unpacked, however. In noting that pirates are "in a perpetual war with every individual, and every state" (Kuhn 2010: 8), pirates are necessarily defined as the exteriority of the global State; indeed, they can be nothing else. Since they are at constant war with the State, they can never be part of the State's interiority and must always be, in DeGean terms, nomadic. Nomads, for Deleuze and Guattari (D&G), are not migrants, but rather people who exist either in zones of exteriority within the State – that is to say, as a 'dweller' within a city –, or in the space exterior to the State proper (Deleuze / Guattari 1987: 500). They have no stable home or allegiance, but move along a path between points of existence and different modes of Being (Deleuze / Guattari 1987: 380–381). The nomad is placed in opposition to the State and, consequently, is in perpetual conflict with the State as the nomad's very existence is an existential threat to the States' stability insofar as the nomad acts as a force of deterritorialization – that is to say, disorganization and destabilization. Where the State seeks to control the physical and psychic space around itself by defining the acceptable flow not only of people via the 'striation' of space, but also the flow of desires via repression, the nomad serves to break with this normative and homogenizing State model by allowing not

only different modes of movement, but also embracing different modes of Being (Deleuze / Guattari 1987: 215, 222–223, 379). On the other hand, it the State has the responsibility, as D&G note, "not only to vanquish nomadism but to control migrations" and thus all aspects of the body politic (Deleuze / Guattari 1987: 385).

Viewing pirates as nomadic and stateless allows us to return to Kuhn's definition and examine how Somalia's pirates fit into this framework. Kuhn only makes brief mention of the Somali pirates in his passing remarks as he notes that "[d]espite certain structural similarities stemming from their common profession, historical pirate communities [...] constitute fundamentally different social phenomena" than "current pirate communities like those operating along the Northeast African coast" (Kuhn 2010: 8). It is my contention, however, that if one looks at pirates through a DeGean framework, one can see that the pirates on the Northeast African coast – that is to say, Somali pirates – are indeed pirates as such. Once the Somali state fell in 1991, the fishing communities already made up of formerly nomadic tribespeople were thrust into both the nomadism and piracy of the Kuhnian and DeGean sense (Waldo 2009). Specifically, the pirates of Somalia, while originally being oriented against external global capital from within the State – as fisherpeople working competitively in a global market –, became defined as Other and were oriented against all states following the collapse of the Somali government. Further, by existing as pirates, their existence necessarily places them exterior to the State, and the State has run with that Otherization, defining the pirates as enemies of all. The pirates operated outside any laws and made their own rules. They had no governmental support, indeed they needed none, and owed no allegiance to any state as there was no state to which they could owe allegiance. Not only were the pirates placed "in a perpetual war with every individual, and every state" (Kuhn 2010: 8) as evidenced by numerous UN resolutions, the 'Global Armada' and the 'War on Piracy', but they became outcasts who operated on the ocean in an attempt to smooth an increasingly striated space (Kuhn 2010: 8; Waldo 2009).

As the Somali pirates evolved, so did their tactics. Before examining a shift in tactics, however, we must distinguish between two types of 'organization' and two types of 'anarchy'. For D&G, being 'organized' is akin to being structured or having a hierarchy. Indeed, organization in the DeGean sense of the term entails being structured under a rigid and hierarchical model (Deleuze / Guattari 1987: 16–21, 158). On the flip-side, for D&G, subjects tend to be fractured, meaning anarchic, and exist as 'Bodies without Organs'. For D&G, such a body is not literally absent a liver, for example, but a body made up of different zones of intensity which are, in turn, 'made up of plateaus' in constant communication with other aspects of the Body with each 'part' doing its own thing absent some overarching, organizing, and structuring principle (Deleuze / Guattari 1987: 158). In Robert Ritchie's history of the war on piracy, however, he distinguishes between organization and anarchy in a slightly different manner. For him, "[o]rganized pirates remained attached to a port as their base of operation" whereas "[a]narchistic marauding involved leaving behind the base of operation and wandering" (Ritchie 1986: 19). During the 1990s, Somali pirates were not fully 'nomadic' in the sense that they were still operating from fixed, static points – namely, small villages on the coasts – when they made their attacks on shipping vessels that came too close to the Somalishore. In this sense, the Somali pirates of so-called 'phase one' piracy of the 1990s can originally be read as organized in the Ritchiean sense of the word while being seen as disorganized or anarchic in the DeGean sense. While they were 'organized' in the sense that they still remained attached to the mainland and only ventured so far from it, they were also weak and unstructured (Lucas 2013: 58). As the pirates evolved, however, their tactics changed and they became more anarchic (in the Ritchiean sense) insofar as fixed

points of land were not as important to them as they became more mobile. Indeed, in the early 2000s, the pirates began using mother ships to launch smaller ships which allowed them both "to greatly extend their operational range, while maintaining the advantages of speed and maneuverability" and to stay at sea longer (Lucas 2013: 59). This second phase of piracy was constituted by more anarchic pirates that were less tied to land, but were better organized as they had built a form of hierarchy and structure. In a word, the early pirates were organized in the Ritchiean sense and anarchic in the DeGean sense whereas later pirates flipped that and were anarchic in the Ritchiean sense and organized in the DeGean sense. Ultimately, the pirates' prowess at sea led to numerous hijackings and caused U.S. Admiral Mike Mullen to note that the pirates are tactically mature, being "well armed… [and] very good at what they do" (Carlson 2009: 1). This ultimately underpins that the Somali fisherpeople are pirates in the proper sense of the word.

The pirate is nationless and thus an individual whose very existence challenges concepts of sovereignty

Pirates vs. Everybody or: A DeGean Take on Somali Piracy

As noted above, pirates have, historically, represented a fundamental break with traditional conceptions of sovereignty and historical socio-economic structures. Indeed, the pirate, by definition, is nationless and is thus an individual whose very existence challenges concepts of sovereignty. This fact is just as true in respect to pirates of the 'Golden Age' of the late 17th century as it is of modern day pirates. In this section, we will take a more explicitly DeGean approach and examine first, not only how pirates utilize the space they occupy, but also how pirates can be seen as utilizing what D&G call the war machine against the State, and second, we will then look at how Somali pirates operate in the context of the aforementioned framework.

For D&G, there are two fundamental modes of space: smooth and striated. Striated space is space that is territorialized and controlled by states. It is space that has been gridded and networked with predetermined pathways and flows and where the movement of bodies is strictly regulated via surveillance – both, active and passive – and repression. Striated space is typified by sovereign control over what the body can do and where the body can go. Indeed, "[i]n striated space, lines or trajectories tend to be subordinated to points" where movement is regulated and restricted according to various flows and desires of power (Deleuze / Guattari 1987: 478). For instance, a series of roads cutting through a pasture to connect two major cities for the purpose of efficient transit would be an example of striated space. Smooth space, on the contrary, is, according to D&G's partially normative model – a model not inherently endorsed here –, a zone of freedom where movement is not relegated to designated paths. There are no roads or rules that govern smooth space, rather the free play of desire is what determines movement in smooth space. In response to the gridding of the smooth space that occurs via striation, "the drawing of a diagonal across the vertical and the horizontal" is an act of rebellion where individuals can choose to break free of the State model (Deleuze / Guattari 1987: 478). As Kuhn notes, "the smooth space is a space for creating self-determined, creative, 'free' forms of life" where individuals are not subject to the rules that govern life in a city or under a State (Kuhn 2010: 28). While there are not many – indeed, potentially any – examples of a truly smooth space, the sea is as close as one can get. Indeed, "the sea", for D&G, "is a smooth space par excellence" insofar as despite the constant

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attempts to control the sea via gridding it with lines of longitude and latitude, the creation of shipping lanes, the mathematicalization and quantification of the space via mapping, et cetera, it can never be truly striated insofar as the sea can neither be completely possessed by one State, nor can it be completely gridded and surveyed (Deleuze / Guattari 1987: 479). Although modern technologies have certainly made the striation of the sea easier, the effectively unmappable and unpredictable nature of the sea makes it a space that defies complete striation as there can always be new paths and conduits that can be taken from point A to point B; as ice melts, new pathways will open and as storms swell, old pathways will be cut off. As the sea constantly changes, apparatuses of power must adapt as nomads utilize the change for their own benefit. Indeed, as D&G note, attempts to unilaterally striate the sea have failed insofar as modern, nomadic technologies have always caught up. For them, "the strategic submarine, which outflanks all gridding and invents a neonomadism in the service of a war machine," pushes the State's attempt to striate space to the limit insofar as diagonal, and indeed, curved, lines can always be drawn under the surface of the regulated space of the top of the sea (Deleuze / Guattari 1987: 480). This feature of the sea also makes it necessarily rhizomatic – that is to say, non-hierarchical and interwoven – insofar as all points can be connected to all other points via novel ways of movement. Further, however, not only do smooth and striated spaces "exist only in mixture: smooth space is constantly being translated, transversed into a striated space [by the State apparatus]; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to a smooth space [by nomads and forces of deterritorialization]," but smooth space always wins out as it "possesses a greater power of deterritorialization than the striated" (Deleuze / Guattari 1987: 474, 480). All that being said, it is important to remember that there are a myriad of different interpretations of D&G – for instance Hardt&Negri's take on subjectivity and the State – and thus there are likely many other fruitful paths of discussion. I am going with the current interpretation laid out in this paper as it seems to more fully capture macropolitics.

Pirates, understood as nomads, operate in ways that deterritorialize, or smooth, striated space. While Kuhn is pessimistic about the relationship between striated space and pirates, even going so far as to say that the striation of the sea "contributed significantly to the end of golden age piracy", I say that Kuhn's view is the reverse of how we ought to look at the relationship between pirates and space (Kuhn 2010: 29). While Kuhn argues that increased monitorization has "carved up" space and made it so undetectability, something that "is inseparable from piracy", is impossible due to "[h]igh-level technology", I say that it is precisely this increased monitorization and striation of the sea that lead to the growth and success of pirates (Kuhn 1997: 232). Golden age pirates were the historical analog to the strategic submarines. D&G mention as they broke with traditional shipping routes, ignored always following lines of longitude and latitude, and thus roamed freely on the high seas. While the sea did become gridded and controlled by states vying for power, pirates could always transcend the State's control by crossing over pre-determined paths, hiding in archipelagos, concealing themselves, et cetera in attempts to hold their ground and, if not deterritorialize the space they occupied, prevent it from being totally territorialized (Kuhn 2010: 28). Although increased surveillance has led to an increased difficulty for pirates to hide or camouflage themselves, the theoretical model of the pirate remained untouched – a band of marauders outside the State who, by definition, waged war upon the State. Even if

Kuhn's thesis is correct – namely that Golden Age piracy declined because the sea became more striated –, this increased striation led to more pressure on nomads who wanted to fight back and gave rise to not only modern pirates who fought for many things, but also to freedom fighters' orientation against exploitation and corruption.

Indeed, as Kuhn notes: "[t]he contemporary parallels are striking. From US-trained and sponsored "Islamic fundamentalists" who have turned against their former mentors, to Latin American contras continuing their terror campaigns after their employment by political interest groups has ended, to militias formed from the remains of former state socialist security agencies, to the government-equipped Janjaweed of Sudan's Darfur region, to the thousands of guerrillas-turned-bandits in all corners of the earth – the state creating its own worst enemy is a recurring theme" (Kuhn 2010: 100).

What's more, pirates can be read as nomads insofar as they not only divide themselves into small groups and spread across the sea in search of loot, but they also have no home or allegiance, instead, they "zig-zag" across the smooth space of the sea in search of their prey (Kuhn 1997: 258). Indeed, Kuhn notes that"[o]ne aspect of the golden age pirates' zig-zagging nomadism is the complete lack of a productive economy [...] the nomadic culture they most closely resemble in terms of economics is that of hunters and gathers" (Kuhn 2010: 25–26).

Further, since pirates are both necessarily exterior to the State and politically oriented against the State, they operate as a DeGean war machine par excellence. For D&G, whenever there is a State – that is to say a tool of territorialization – there is always something external that must act as a deterritorializing force. For them, this force is the war machine, a machinic tool that is used to analyze the interplay of power. Indeed, where the State can be seen as a tool to striate space and maintain control over flows of movement and desire, the war machine can be seen as the anti-thesis, a tool utilized by nomadic groups to create chaos and undo the work of the State. The war machine is a counter-balance to the power of the State, and while many groups have served this function, pirates, as enemies of all States, epitomize the war machine. Indeed, the pirates' very existence and definition as being in constant war against every State necessarily turns them into manifestations of the war machine. As D&G note, "each time there is an operation against the State [...] it can be said that a war machine has revived", and piratical, anti-State operations serve the function of "a new nomadic potential [that] has appeared, accompanied by the reconstitution of a smooth space" (Deleuze / Guattari 1987: 386). As Kuhn notes of the relationship between the war machine and the State: "A nomadic war machine is a necessary element of an anti-statist society" (Kuhn 1997: 266). Taking all the above into consideration, the Somali pirates can be read as the contemporary analogs of Kuhn's golden age pirates who operate nomadically and utilize the war machine for their own benefit. Indeed, since the fall of the Somali government, the fisherpeople turned pirates have oriented themselves against the State as such, and have resisted any attempts to be controlled. They have not only been defined as the Other against whom a war must be waged, but they define themselves as Other in relation to the supra-national State. Whenever the US tries to assert dominance in the Gulf of Aden or around the Horn of Africa, the Somali pirates are there to counterbalance the State apparatus. Whenever 'safe shipping lanes' are guaranteed to promote the flow of goods from third world countries to first world countries or of arms from first world countries to third world rebels, Somali pirates stand as a force of exteriority pushing back upon global capital. While the pirates may not be knights fighting against capital – indeed, their motives may often be selfish –, this theoretical understanding of them places them in opposition to the State and allows for more rigorous understandings of their operation in future studies. This is, ultimately, the force of the DeGean analysis; to try to open up discussion about a group of people often condemned without background knowledge. Indeed, with State knowledge so hegemonic, alternatives are necessary and setting the record straight is vital. With the State defined as their enemy, the pirates utilize the war machine not "to establish totalitarian orders", but rather to establish "creative line[s] of flight" that are "meant to destroy the state and its cronies" (Kuhn 2010: 98). While they may have started as mere fisherpeople trying to regain control of their territorial waters from IUU fleets, the Somali pirates have morphed into something bigger. They are no longer mere fisherpeople, but rather a nomadic force aligned against the global State and the interests of global capital in the service not of some higher ideal, but in the service of themselves and their kin. They are to us what the barbarians were to the Greeks. They exist by themselves, for themselves, and external to us. They are the war machine instantiated.

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